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COPYRIGHT PROTECTION’S
CHALLENGES AND ALASKA
NATIVES’ CULTURAL PROPERTY
STUART SCHÜSSEL*
INTRODUCTION
There is something immediately distinctive about the Northwest
Coast Barbie. While she shares the same impossible physique and high
heels common to Mattel’s iconic product line, the Northwest Coast
Barbie sports a dark complexion, and her black hair falls onto an earthy,
patterned “Chilkat blanket.”1 The box identifies this particular Barbie as
a member of the Tlingit; a brief description of the Tlingit follows.2
This doll illustrates just one way in which Americans are familiar
with Alaska Native art and imagery, even if they have never been to
Alaska and do not know any Alaska Natives. The significance of some
items, like totem poles, is common knowledge. A hawk designed in the
artistic style native to the Pacific Northwest serves as the logo for the
Seattle Seahawks. Trinkets and souvenirs in Alaska Native styles are
regularly purchased by the thousands of tourists who visit Alaska each
year.
Beyond its popular appeal, Alaska Native art enjoys attention from
academics and art collectors. Museums around the country hold large
collections of Alaskan art; the Smithsonian’s National Museum of the
American Indian boasts over a thousand Alaska Native objects.3 Alaskan
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1. Liz Ruskin, “Tlingit Barbie, but Barbie Nonetheless,” MILWAUKEE
JOURNAL SENTINEL, Mar. 8, 2000, at 12B (“Her long, synthetic hair cascades over
the fuzzy Chilkat blanket . . . . “).
2. For a picture of Northwest Coast Barbie and the text on the
accompanying packaging, see Northwest Coast Native American Barbie Doll, BARBIE
COLLECTOR,
http://www.barbiecollector.com/shop/doll/northwest-coastnative-american-barbie-doll-24671 (last visited Nov. 11, 2012).
3. See, e.g., Collections and Research, NAT’L MUSEUM OF THE AMERICAN
INDIAN,
http://www.americanindian.si.edu/searchcollections/results.aspx?
catids =0&place=alaska&src=1-3 (last visited Oct. 7, 2012) (displaying thumbnail
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art also features prominently in Native American art auctions, with a
Tlingit rattle fetching $625,000 last year at Christie’s.4
Given the popularity and economic importance of Alaskan arts and
crafts, Alaska Native communities would benefit from the use and sale
of their cultural property. Additionally, like other indigenous peoples,
Alaska Natives seek to block the use of images and objects with sacred
and religious significance. Therefore, some groups of Alaska Natives,
most notably the Sealaska Heritage Institute, have taken measures to
protect their cultural property and have begun to call for increased
intellectual property protection.5 Unfortunately, most of the works these
groups seek to protect are not eligible for copyright protection because
of conflicts with copyright requirements. For instance, the requirement
of fixation in a tangible medium of expression6 would preclude
protection for oral folklore and songs. Additionally, many of the
remedies these groups desire, such as the ability to block the use of
sacred images, cannot be provided under current copyright laws.
Therefore, Alaska Natives and other indigenous groups would have to
obtain intellectual property-like protection through a sui generis regime,
deviating from the existing framework.
This issue is not limited to Alaska. Indigenous intellectual property
issues have attracted global attention. Despite many efforts to address
indigenous communities’ need and desire to protect their intellectual
property, the international community has not reached a consensus
about how to accomplish this goal.7 The World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) continues to be involved in efforts to develop a
framework to approach and address these issues.8 Indigenous peoples’

photos of the museum collection).
4. Northwest Coast Ceremonial Rattle, CHRISTIE’S, http://www.christies.com
/lotfinder/northwest-coast-ceremonial-raven-rattle-probably-tlingit
/5400615/lot/lot_details.aspx?from=salesummary&intObjectID
=5400615&sid=d73d8283-3de0-4e1e-9ad1-79b57add7027 (last visited Oct. 7,
2012) (displaying a photo of the rattle and a brief description).
5. See, e.g., Cultural and Intellectual Property Rights Policy, SEALASKA
HERITAGE INST. (Jan. 16, 2004), http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/
www/tk/en/folklore
/creative_heritage/docs/sealaska_cultural_policy.pdf
(describing process implemented by the Sealaska Heritage Institute).
6. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (“Copyright protection subsists, in
accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression . . . .”).
7. Jane Anderson, issues paper, Indigenous/Traditional Knowledge &
Intellectual Property, at 2 (2010), available at http://web.law.duke.edu/cspd
/itkpaper (discussing the state of international efforts to protect traditional
intellectual property, and referencing organizations working on the issue).
8. Matters Concerning the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property
and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, WORLD INTELLECTUAL
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concerns range across all areas of the intellectual property spectrum,
and, as will be discussed in more detail, the protection of any particular
item may simultaneously raise questions that span many areas of
intellectual property law.9
Outsiders commonly exploit the intellectual property of indigenous
persons. Many medical discoveries have relied on indigenous people’s
knowledge of the properties of local plants.10 From this body of
knowledge ethnobotanists and other researchers have analyzed
rainforest plants, hoping to identify chemical compounds to serve as
active ingredients in pharmaceuticals.11 Beyond serving as source
material for pharmaceutical research, traditional cultural practices can
become commodities themselves: Bikram Choudhury studied yoga,
selected several positions, then copyrighted his arrangement of the
poses to develop the yoga program that bears his name. Yoga studio
owners who want to use the Bikram yoga sequence, or to use the name
Bikram Yoga, must license from Choudhury.12 Although the validity of
his copyright has been challenged, lawsuits against infringing studios
have settled, leaving questions over the validity of Bikram’s copyright
unresolved.13
The Bikram Yoga example highlights a greater issue: scholarly
research on indigenous knowledge can receive copyright protection.
Thus, if an academic catalogues dance series or rituals, that could be
copyrighted. When indigenous groups seek to use the collections as
source material, they may need to secure the permission of the copyright
owners to make use of the indigenous groups’ own historic cultural

PROPERTY
ORGANIZATION,
at
4
(Oct.
5,
2011),
available
at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/govbody/en/wo_ga_40/wo_ga_40_7.pdf
(detailing a framework for the protection of traditional knowledge and folklore).
9. Anderson, supra note 7, at 2 (discussing how a single traditional piece
could raise issues regarding copyright, trademark, design, and confidential
information).
10. See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 128 (1st ed. 1996) (describing two
examples: tribal medicines being successful in killing the AIDS virus, and vinca
alkaloids from Madagascar being used to treat diabetes).
11. See id.
12. Anderson, supra note 7, at 11–12 (discussing Bikram Choudhury’s
copyrights, licensing process, and aggressive enforcement of his copyright
claim).
13. See, e.g., Open Source Yoga Unity v. Bikram Choudhury, No. C 03-3182
PJH, 2005 WL 756558, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2005) (“[T]here are numerous
questions of fact at issue which prevent the court from determining on summary
judgment . . . .”); Anderson, supra note 7, at 12 (arguing that Choudhury’s
selection and arrangement of the poses would likely satisfy the criteria for
copyrighting compilations of facts and ideas).
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property.14 Therefore, Bikram Choudhury’s actions unsurprisingly
prompted “a large scale effort to catalog the estimated 1500 asanas, yoga
body positions, in order to prevent [future] cases.”15
This Note will survey several topics pertaining to Alaska Natives’
cultural property. Section I provides an overview of copyright, the area
of American intellectual property law most related to the protection of
artistic property, focusing on copyright’s requirements and its
theoretical grounding. Section II discusses generally Native American
views on property and the difficulties encountered when seeking to
apply copyright law to Native American works. This Section will
contrast the United States’ unwillingness to judicially recognize
collective property rights with two Australian cases. Section III
highlights two existing methods to accomplish some of the goals of
Alaska Native groups: the Silver Hand authentication program, a
collective mark, and Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act (NAGPRA), which allows tribes to seek trade secretlike protection for their sacred cultural property. Section IV surveys
recent, or current, topics of interest to Alaska Natives, highlighting that
disputes could be resolved without needing to alter intellectual property
law.

I. THE EXISTING AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
FRAMEWORK: INHERENT BIASES OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
Understanding the potential for conflicts between Alaska Natives’
concerns and the American legal system requires an understanding of
the existing copyright framework. Copyright is the dominant paradigm
for the protection of cultural property in the United States. This system
incentivizes and rewards artists and authors by granting time-limited
exclusive rights, including the rights to make reproductions and
adaptations. These rights allow the author to block certain uses of his
work.16 Copyright intends to balance incentives for authors with the
public’s interest in having unfettered access to a comprehensive
inventory of cultural property.17 Thus, once the copyright protection

14. Anderson, supra note 7, at 24 (proposing a copyright exception for
indigenous people for works derived from their cultural knowledge).
15. Id. at 12 (discussing a potential legal challenge to Bikram’s copyrights as
a misappropriation of cultural knowledge).
16. MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 2 (5th ed. 2010)
(discussing that copyright law creates property rights for intangible products or
“works of authorship”).
17. JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 48–49 (1st ed. 2008) (discussing the
theoretical framework of the public domain). In a famous dissent, Justice
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term ends for a given work, that work permanently enters the public
domain.18
By comparison, many European countries protect literary and
creative expression using an analogous system, droit d’auteur. In contrast
to the common law copyright system, droit d’auteur emphasizes authors’
moral rights, chiefly the right of authors to control and protect their
works.19 These rights evidence a philosophical starting point that is
more strongly supportive of authors. For instance, under this system
authors may object to any action that would abridge, distort, or
prejudicially alter their works.20
Since the enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act, artistic expression
has, by default, received copyright protection.21 Works obtain automatic
protection upon the moment of fixation in a tangible medium of
expression.22 This protection lasts for seventy years after the life of the
author to allow the author and his heirs to benefit financially.23
A.

Requirements for Copyright Protection

To be eligible for copyright protection, an item must be more than
simply an idea or concept. Traditionally, explanations and expressions
receive copyright protection, while the concepts and ideas do not; the

Brandeis articulated that “[t]he general rule of law is, that the noblest of human
productions—knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas—become,
after voluntary communication to others, free as the air to common use.” Int’l
News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (discussing the copying and
dissemination of wire source news articles by third parties).
18. BOYLE, supra note 17, at 48–49 (noting, however, that the public domain
of “facts and ideas” is being enclosed, and the idea of common intellectual
property is under assault).
19. LEAFFER, supra note 16, at 389 (two fundamental components of this
system include the rights of integrity and paternity).
20. See Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 26 (2d Cir. 1976) (abridging
episodes of Monty Python was an action that impermissibly and prejudicially
altered the authors’ work).
21. BOYLE, supra note 17, at 184 (placing liberal requirements on copyright
creation with no formal notice or application). This is a contrast from the prior
1909 Copyright Act, under which copyright protection was only obtained upon
publication and only if an author complied with the requisite formalities, such as
notice. See 1909 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1926) (requiring copyright notice,
registration, and deposit).
22. BOYLE, supra note 17, at 184; see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“A work is
‘created’ when it is fixed in a copy or phonorecord for the first time; where a
work is prepared over a period of time, the portion of it that has been fixed at
any particular time constitutes the work as of that time, and where the work has
been prepared in different versions, each version constitutes a separate work.”).
23. Copyright Term Extension Act, 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012) (the Copyright
Term Extension Act added an additional twenty years from fifty to seventy).
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latter instead enter the public domain.24 In certain contexts, there may be
only limited ways to express a particular idea. This situation, called the
merger doctrine, precludes copyright protection, lest the idea receive
backdoor copyright.
1. Fixation
First and fundamentally, a work must be fixed. Fixation occurs as
soon as an idea is manifest in a tangible medium, such as writing a
sentence or drawing an image.25 This requirement relates to the
constitutional bases of intellectual property protection; the intellectual
property clause affords protection to “writings.”26 Thus, a work must be
embodied in some stable format, a requirement that can be met once the
work is recorded or written. This leads to an important distinction:
performances cannot qualify for copyright, but recordings of the
performance as well as scripts written in advance of the performance,
can support copyright.27
2. Originality
A work must also be original.28 In order to be original, a work must
be more than a trivial variation on something already existing, either
currently under copyright or in the public domain.29 The originality
inquiry focuses on whether an author has contributed any identifiable
artistic expression; absent any originality, a work cannot be considered
the product of the author seeking copyright.30
The two elements of originality are some modest amount of
creative authorship and independent creation. In the definitive case in
this area, Feist v. Rural Telephone Service,31 the Supreme Court articulated
the rule that only a modicum of creativity is required for a work to be

24. BOYLE, supra note 10, at 208 (highlighting the fundamental distinction
between the underlying idea and the copyrightable product).
25. LEAFFER, supra note 16, at 49 (“The Supreme Court has construed the
‘writings’ requirement to mean any physical rendering of the fruits of
intellectual activity.”).
26. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (promoting “Science and the useful Arts”).
27. LEAFFER, supra note 16, at 49–51 (stating that “mere performance of a
work does not qualify under this provision”).
28. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (“Copyright subsists . . . in original works of
authorship.”).
29. See, e.g., L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 488–89 (2d Cir.
1976) (no originality in plaintiff’s bank design, which was virtually identical to
an existing public domain bank design).
30. See 1 DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01 (rev. ed. 2009)
(distinguishing novelty and originality).
31. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).

SCHUSSEL_V8.0 (DO NOT DELETE)

2012

COPYRIGHT AND CULTURAL PROPERTY

12/9/2012 5:59 PM

319

considered sufficiently original to merit copyright protection.32
Similarly, independent creation sets a relatively low bar. Unlike patent
law, which requires novelty and non-obviousness, two works may be
substantially similar or even identical, yet if both were independently
created, each can qualify for copyright protection.33
3. Authorship
The concept of authorship provides a theoretical grounding for
copyright law.34 Notions of authorship have varied widely across
Western history;35 as recently as the medieval period, authors were
viewed as divinely inspired craftsmen.36 It was not until the eighteenth
century that theorists began to regard inspiration as “emanating not
from outside or above,” but rather “from within the writer himself.”37
This Romantic notion of authorship viewed writing as “an extreme
assertion of the self.”38 Authors became viewed as innovators, who,
using the raw materials of culture and prior knowledge, added original
ideas and expression to create distinct works.39 This view essentially
considers writing a manifestation of the author’s personality, regardless
of the aesthetic quality or purpose of the work.40 In turn, the Romantic

32. Id. at 345–46 (distinguishing novelty from creativity, and stating that
similarity between two works does not defeat originality so long as the
similarity is not the result of copying).
33. LEAFFER, supra note 16, at 57 (stating that “nothing prevents a valid claim
of copyright on two or more substantially similar works so long as they were
independently created”). This situation may be increasingly unlikely in an
increasingly connected world; questions of access to works have decided
copyright infringement actions. See, e.g., Three Boys Music v. Bolton, 212 F.3d
477, 482 (9th Cir. 2000) (inferring access on basis of popular song’s airplay).
34. BOYLE, supra note 10, at 53 (noting that authorship was historically
devalued in favor of those who could copy and interpret old texts).
35. See id. (pointing to medieval church literature, where the “real task of
the scholar was not the vain excogitation of novelties but a discovery of great old
books”).
36. Id. at 53–54 (authors were viewed on the same level as a publisher or
typesetter, another machine element in the production of written material).
37. Id. at 54 (for example, prior to the rise of the Romantic view of
authorship, the English language lacked a word for plagiarism).
38. Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of
“Authorship,” 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 455 (1991) (discussing the view of authorship
during the eighteenth century).
39. BOYLE, supra note 10, at 54–55 (arguing that the originality of the form of
the work shapes the ideas contained therein, thus the author must retain the
right to exclude others from altering the form of the work).
40. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903).
Though the work in question was used in advertising, Justice Holmes
considered it a work of authorship: “The copy is the personal reaction of an
individual upon nature. Personality always contains something unique . . . .
[Even] a very modest grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is one
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view of authorship justifies rewarding authors’ efforts in producing
literary and artistic works with the right to control the use and
distribution of their works.41
This Romantic notion of authorship also provides a strong platform
for the moral rights seen in Continental Europe.42 In these legal systems,
authors have the right to withdraw works from circulation, to claim
attribution (the “paternity” right), and to prevent destruction or
mutilation of their works (the “integrity” right).43 These rights clearly
derive from a view “that the work of art is an extension of the artist’s
personality, an expression of his innermost being. To mistreat the work
of art is to mistreat the artist, to invade his area of privacy, to impair his
personality.”44
Despite their prominence in European law, moral rights have never
fully caught on in the United States.45 As these moral rights are
generally inalienable and can be invoked even after sale of intellectual
property rights, some consider moral rights to “represent a charter for
private censorship,”46 which is incompatible with the public interest.
However, Congress has given some limited recognition of moral rights.
Because of certain foreign treaty obligations,47 Congress eventually
enacted the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (“VARA”).48 VARA allows
creators of works of “fine art” to obtain the rights of attribution,
integrity, or protection from distortion.49 It also protects works of
“recognized stature” against destruction.50 Determining whether a work
of art is of the requisite “recognized stature” requires judges to assess its

man’s alone. That something he may copyright . . . .” Id. at 249–50.
41. Jaszi, supra note 38, at 466 (challenging the notion of authorship as it
relates to copyright).
42. Id. at 496 (discussing the entrenched Romantic notion of authorship in
Continental European legal systems).
43. Id. (discussing generally the rights-based approach to copyright).
44. Id. at 497 (quoting JOHN H. MERRYMAN & ALBERT E. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS,
AND THE VISUAL ARTS 145 (2d ed. 1987)).
45. LEAFFER, supra note 16, at 392–93 (stating that “Congress justified its
decision not to adopt specific moral rights legislation, claiming that the United
States already gives de facto recognition to moral rights when the entirety of
American law is considered”).
46. Jaszi, supra note 38, at 497 (discussing the suppressing effect of assigning
moral rights to authorship).
47. Berne Convention for the Protection of Artistic and Literary Property,
Art. 6bis, 1971.
48. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990).
49. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A. VARA-eligible works can include paintings,
drawings, and sculptures, so long as the work is produced in no more than 200
numbered and signed copies. Id.
50. Id.
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aesthetic merits,51 which deviates from copyright’s otherwise established
principle that judges should not make decisions about artistic and
aesthetic quality.52
B.

Rights of a Copyright Holder and Limitations to the Exclusive
Rights

During the term of copyright protection, the owner of a copyright
in a work enjoys a bundle of certain exclusive rights.53 These rights
include reproduction, adaptation, distribution, performance, display,
and the right to transmit digital sound recordings.54 Violating any of
these exclusive rights constitutes copyright infringement.55 Because the
rights may overlap in certain contexts, the same act may simultaneously
infringe multiple exclusive rights.56
Despite these exclusive rights, the Copyright Act contains several
exceptions.57 One of the most important, fair use,58 allows certain
privileged uses in situations where the public interest in access to a
work outweighs the interest in protecting the work under copyright
law.59

51. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 612 (7th Cir. 1999)
(demonstrating a rigorous standard for assessing whether a work is “of
recognized stature,” including expert testimony, critical acclaim, and journalistic
coverage).
52. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249–50 (1903)
(articulating that the granting of a copyright should not be premised on a work’s
artistic merit or intended use).
53. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (defining the exclusive rights of copyrighted
works, including right to reproduce, create derivative works based upon
original, distribute copies, and perform or display publicly).
54. Id. (enumerating rights granted under statute).
55. See § 501(a) (defining one who infringes a copyright as any person who
violates those rights exclusive to the owner of the copyright).
56. LEAFFER, supra note 16, at 294 (stating that “the same act may
simultaneously infringe both the reproduction and adaptation rights”).
57. See §§ 107–122 (exemptions on exclusive rights include provisions for
fair use, restrictions for media outlets, recordings, visual displays, and computer
programs).
58. § 107 (detailing the factors considered when determining whether a use
of copyright material falls within the fair use exception).
59. Jerome Reichman & Ruth Okediji, The Fair Use Approach in the United
States, 96 U. MINN. L. REV. 1362, 1393–94 (2012). See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Bernard
Greis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (holding that the public
interest in accessing the only existing footage of the Kennedy assassination
supported a fair use defense); but see Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 565 (1985) (rejecting a fair use defense where a publisher
excerpted the “heart of the book” from Gerald Ford’s memoir shortly before its
forthcoming publication.).
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Litigating copyright disputes requires proving both ownership of a
valid copyright and infringement by violation of at least one of the
exclusive rights. Litigation is a costly process and may be very time
consuming. As a result, many individuals choose to comply with
licensing arrangements rather than expose themselves to potential
liability, even in situations where exceptions, such as fair use, could
have applied.60 Intellectual property law may thus stifle creativity and
burden the very artistic and creative processes it seeks to encourage.61

II. COMMON INDIGENOUS VIEWS OF PROPERTY OWNERSHIP AND
TENSIONS WITH THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME
Aspects of indigenous groups’ cultural property do not always
coincide with the assumptions that underlie both the copyright and droit
d’auteur systems. Because of these potential incompatibilities, many
indigenous groups view intellectual property regimes with deep
skepticism.62 Some indigenous people view adopting intellectual
property laws as acquiescing to the legacy of colonialism.63
A.

Baseline approaches to cultural property

The Anglo-American copyright system grants exclusive rights as an
incentive to encourage authors and artists to create. Like most western
property law systems, copyright is a bundle of rights including rights to
absolute possession, to exclude others, and to dispose of property
freely.64 Thus, copyright fits neatly into the western legal paradigm.
By contrast, indigenous communities have different conceptions of
property ownership. Exclusive ownership is rare among North
American tribes.65 Tribes nevertheless may recognize ownership in
intangible items like songs, stories, or even practices such as fishing or
60. See, e.g., BOYLE, supra note 17, at 158 (citing the music industry’s
compulsory licensing scheme).
61. See id. at 158–59 (noting, however, that there is a potential shift to
recognize that copyright laws do stifle the creativity they purport to protect).
62. ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES:
AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW 245 (1st ed. 1998) (arguing that
reducing communal relationships in Native tribes to copyrights would degrade
the social fabric of the society).
63. See id. (describing the assertion of rights over traditional art forms as a
part of self-determination).
64. 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2012) (defining copyright ownership).
65. Ruth L. Gana, Has Creativity Died in the Third World? Some Implications of
the Internationalization of Intellectual Property, 24 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 109, 132
(1995) (contrasting Native American and Anglo-American conceptions of
individual ownership).
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gathering plants.66 Some compare ownership in these cultural practices,
such as oral storytelling, as responsibilities more akin to stewardship
rather than “rights,”67 since often ownership of the practices or rituals
reflects a member’s role in the group.68
Thus, the incentive rationale that underlies copyright may be
irrelevant to the concerns of indigenous societies, where cases about
intellectual property have more often focused on “the sanctity of a
process or idea, . . . and in particular, [efforts] to preserve the sacredness
of an object.”69 Tribes typically do not concern themselves with the
disposition of knowledge within the tribe, but consider impermissible
the dissemination of knowledge and cultural patrimony to outsiders.70
Incidentally, NAGPRA specifically seeks to address this problem by
facilitating the repatriation of sacred objects and cultural patrimony to
Native American tribes.71
B.

Difficulties of meeting the eligibility requirements for copyright
protection

Many aspects of indigenous cultural property conflict with the
theoretical grounding and legal requirements of copyright law. On a
theoretical level, copyright operates in “the private realm of artistic
activity.”72 Intellectual property law protects private actors, who draw
on a public culture to produce private, tangible works.73 In one view, the
66. Id.
67. COOMBE, supra note 62, at 245 n.164 (“Those so-called ‘rights’ are the
result of traditional people fulfilling responsibilities . . . through traditional
ceremony and lifestyle . . . .” (quoting D. Alexis, Obscurity as a Lifestyle, 23
BORDERLINES 15 (1991–92))).
68. Rennard Strickland, Implementing the National Policy of Understanding,
Preserving, and Safeguarding the Heritage of Indian Peoples and Native Hawaiians:
Human Rights, Sacred Objects, and Cultural Patrimony, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 175, 184
(1992) (An individual’s power may be manifest in “implements, fetishes,
medicine bundles, charms, songs, dances, and rituals. Sacred power, or
medicine, was obtained through spirit visitations during visions, supernatural
gifts, ceremonial transfer, or inheritance.”).
69. Gana, supra note 65, at 134 (citing Milpurrurru v. Indofurn Party, Ltd.
(1994) 54 FCR 240, 240 (Austl.) (finding that the sale of art portrayed on rugs
damaged not only the individual artists, but also the community)).
70. Id. at 133 (discussing ownership paradigms of various indigenous
populations).
71. See, e.g., Strickland, supra note 68, at 180–81 (“NAGPRA has placed the
primary task of factual determination in the Native culture itself.”).
72. Terence Dougherty, Group Rights to Cultural Survival: Intellectual Property
Rights in Native American Cultural Symbols, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 355, 374–
75 (1998) (contrasting “private artistic activity” with “public cultural
production”).
73. Id. (noting that art produced by “public cultural production” is viewed
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public domain supplies cultural raw materials, such as beliefs and
common symbols, which are considered to be created by “collectivities”
rather than any particular individual.74 Many of the objects Alaska
Natives are concerned about protecting, such as crests and symbols,
would fall into this category of collective property, material more
typically regarded as cultural inputs rather than outputs. Therefore, in
theory these materials belong in the public domain, and are accordingly
ineligible for copyright protection.
Similarly, copyright’s emphasis on authorship presents additional
hurdles for indigenous works. The 1976 Act requires an identifiable
author or group of authors, who evidence intent to create a work.75 As
discussed above, authorship is rooted in Romantic ideals of authors as
individuals. This stands in stark contrast to Native communities’
attitudes, where tribal works originate “in the group, not the
individual.”76 Furthermore, in the case of many works, such as songs or
stories, it is “unlikely, given indigenous methods of production, that any
individual tribal member ever claimed the role of ‘author.’”77 Often,
knowledge of a specific creator will have passed on, rendering the work
untraceable.78 Last, even if the original author is known or discoverable,
since copyright is a time-limited regime, any potential copyright likely
would have expired in works that are generations old.79
Native works with collective authorship could also be considered
joint works.80 Joint works are “work[s] prepared by two or more authors

to be owned by the public rather than particular individuals).
74. Id. (making it nearly impossible to identify a distinct author).
75. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–02 (2012) (discussing that copyright protection extends
to “original works of authorship,” as compared to an “anonymous” work in
which no natural person can be identified as author); see also Angela Riley, Note,
Recovering Collectivity: Group Rights to Intellectual Property in Indigenous
Communities, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 175, 190 (2000) (highlighting the
importance of defining authorship in light of the Act’s explicit requirement of a
discreet author or group of authors).
76. Riley, supra note 75, at 191 (noting the demonization of communal work
in western, capitalist culture).
77. Id. (noting that works with untraceable authors cannot receive copyright
protection).
78. Id. (stating that even if the creator were identified, he or she would most
likely have passed away, with the relevant result that the work is “untraceable”
in terms of authorship and therefore may not be granted copyright protection);
see also Richard Guest, Intellectual Property Rights and Native American Tribes, 20
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 111, 124 (1995) (enumerating the requirements for copyright
protection under the Copyright Act).
79. Riley, supra note 75, at 191 n.83 (copyrighted works cannot be protected
in perpetuity).
80. Id. at 192 (describing the requirements under the Copyright Act to be
classified as a “joint work”).
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with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or
interdependent parts of a unitary whole.”81 Similar difficulties arise
when attempting to apply this framework to Native works. First, the
parties must have intended, at the moment of creation, that their
contributions be merged into a joint work.82 Second, the authors must
have been known, which is often infeasible.83 Thus, indigenous works
will fail to be eligible for copyright even as joint works.
Indigineous works might also not qualify as original. Instead, many
works could be considered “serial collaborations,” with elaboration on
ideas by a series of authors, “occurring perhaps over years or
decades.”84 These serial collaborations reflect the centrality of stories to
group identity.85 However, because it may be difficult to identify any
element of a work that is an author’s distinct and original contribution,
indigenous works may thus fail to satisfy this requirement.86
Fixation presents yet another hurdle for Native American works.
Copyright is generally “geared towards protecting the printed word,”87
a baseline exemplified in the fixation requirement. Thus, copyright
protection is precluded for works which are unwritten but rather
transmitted orally.88 Fixing oral traditions in writing isolates a particular
version of a story, and forces tribes to abandon the traditional medium
of expression.89 However, even works that satisfy the fixation
requirement, such as sculptures or drawings, may still be precluded
from copyright protection on other grounds.
Since many Native works are not eligible for copyright, the owners
of the works or the tribes will be unable to avail themselves of

81. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); see also § 201(a) (making authors of a joint work
co-owners of the copyright).
82. NIMMER, supra note 30, § 6.02.
83. Riley, supra note 75, at 193 (also noting that joint intent at the time of
creation is also often infeasible in tribal art).
84. Id. at 188 (noting that tribal art such as traditional songs have an
unknown origination point).
85. Id. at 189 (highlighting the importance of traditional creation stories to
tribal cultures).
86. See COOMBE, supra note 62, at 229 (discussing a difficulty in separating
“texts from ongoing creative production, or ongoing creativity from social
relationships” as intellectual property law strives to do).
87. Riley, supra note 75, at 186 (noting that the emphasis on the printed word
derives from Anglo-American culture).
88. Id. (stating that oral transmissions “fall entirely outside the sphere of
Anglo-American copyright protection”); see also Gana, supra note 65, at 128
(discussing other works and practices which could fail to meet the fixation
requirement, such as the Yoruba “talking drums”).
89. Riley, supra note 75, at 195 (proposing that indigenous philosophies
should be incorporated to deal with Tribal works).
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copyright’s remedies. If no copyright is recognized in a work, there is no
right to block reproductions or derivative works based on that
underlying work.90

III. COLLECTIVE RIGHTS
Native groups are not only concerned with the outright
infringement of their cultural property,91 but are also concerned with the
translation and resulting distortion of their works,92 as well as the
misuse of sacred objects,93 harms which NAGPRA strives to avoid.94
These concerns seem apt for protections provided in a moral rights
framework.
Nevertheless, American courts have faced difficulties in cases
involving Native American cultural property. In order to arrive at
outcomes in line with the interests of tribes, courts must be able to assess
collective rights. Chilkat Indian Village v. Johnson95 demonstrates the
federal courts’ failure to recognize collective rights.96 This Alaska case
involved the Chilkat tribe’s efforts to recover cultural artifacts after their
sale by caretakers.97 The artifacts in question, the Whale House of the
Chilkat, four wooden carved posts and a partition, were considered “the
finest example of Native art, either Tlingit or Tsimshian, in Alaska.”98

90. Id. at 179 (discussing the parameters of contemporary copyright law, in
which narrowly defined boundaries are drawn).
91. Id. at 197 (discussing the appropriation and manipulation of Native
cultural art).
92. Strickland, supra note 68, at 185. “A non-Indian viewer of a Hopi figure,
a Tlingit mask, or a Shoshone-painted hide translates the object into the familiar
framework of his own culture. In doing so he confronts the same distortion as
the English-speaking reader of a translated Cherokee love song . . . . No longer a
linguistic reflection of its maker, the song becomes a carnival mirror, distorting
the delicate thought patterns of its creator’s culture.” Id.
93. Id. (comparing non-Native perceptions of Native linguistic art and the
viewing of Native objects, asserting that the distortions are equivalent).
94. See H.R. Rep. No. 877, at 8 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4367,
4368 (“The purpose of H.R. [NAGPRA] is to protect Native American burial sites
and the removal of human remains, funerary objects, sacred objects, and objects
of cultural patrimony on Federal, Indian and Native Hawaiian lands.”).
95. 870 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 1989).
96. Id. at 1476 (holding that claims of conversion of Native property did not
arise under federal law).
97. Id. at 1471 (describing the articles in question, four wooden posts and a
wooden partition called a “rain screen”).
98. George T. Emmons, The Whale House of the Chilkat, in RAVEN’S BONES 68,
81 (Andrew Hope III ed., 1982) (1916) (“It is unquestionably the finest example
of native art, either Tlingit or Tsimishian, in Alaska, in boldness of conception—
although highly conventionalized in form—in execution of detail, and in the
selection and arrangement of colors.”).
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For years, outsiders engaged in efforts to purchase or steal the
Whale House.99 Defendant Johnson, a Native American art dealer,
successfully made a deal with the artifacts’ caretakers.100 The Chilkat
tribe claimed the artifacts were communal property, or property owned
in trust, and thus the artifacts could neither be owned nor transferred by
the caretakers. Although the Chilkat Village had previously passed an
ordinance forbidding the removal of tribal cultural property,101 the
artifacts were removed and shipped to Johnson, the purchaser. The tribe
sued to recover the artifacts, but the Ninth Circuit upheld the district
court’s dismissal of the Chilkat claims.102 The court refused to consider
communal property rights, since they were (and remain) unrecognized
in federal law.103 Dismissing the remaining claims, the Ninth Circuit
agreed with the district court that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to
rule on claims grounded in the Chilkat Village ordinance, since those
claims did not arise under federal law.104
While the study of American intellectual property law reveals a
bias against collective rights,105 this does not mean American law is
blind to collective rights. Even as far back as the so-called “Indian
Commerce Clause,”106 tribes have been uniquely recognized “as quasi99. Chilkat, 870 F.2d at 1471 (“On April 22, 1984, several defendants
removed the four posts and the rain screen from Klukwan and delivered them to
defendant Michael Johnson, an Arizona art dealer.”).
100. Rachael Grad, Note, Indigenous Rights and Intellectual Property Law: A
Comparison of the United States and Australia, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 203, 215
(2003) (“Upon hearing that Johnson had reached a deal with one of the elderly
caretakers, Chilkat tribal members blocked the village road and passed an
ordinance forbidding the removal of cultural property without tribal
permission.”).
101. Chilkat, 870 F.2d at 1471 (The ordinance stated, “[n]o person shall enter
on to the property of the Chilkat Indian Village for the purpose of buying,
trading for, soliciting the purchase of, or otherwise seeking to arrange the
removal of artifacts, clan crests, or other traditional Indian art work owned or
held by members of the Chilkat Indian Village or kept within the boundaries of
the real property owned by the Chilkat Indian Village, without first requesting
and obtaining permission to do so from the Chilkat Indian Village Council.”).
102. Id. at 1472–73 (“We agree that section 1163 provides no right of action.”).
103. Id. (“We also agree with the district court that the Village’s first and fifth
causes of action amount to claims for conversion, and that they do not arise
under federal law.”).
104. Id. Thereafter, a case was brought in the Chilkat Indian Village Tribal
Court. Tribal Court Judge Bowen upheld the validity of the ordinance and
ordered the return of the artifacts. Chilkat Indian Village, IRA v. Johnson, 90-01
(Chilkat Tr. Ct., 1993) (“The artifacts are to be returned to the Whale House in
Klukwan.”).
105. See generally Riley, supra note 75, at 194 (“When all possible avenues of
copyright doctrine are examined, it is clear that no Western definitions of
authorship are capable of accommodating communal works.”).
106. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. (Empowering Congress “[t]o regulate
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sovereign nations-within-a-nation.”107 In a more recent legislative
development, the passage of the Indian Child Welfare Act108 by
Congress displayed sensitivity to the unique aspects of tribal culture and
values that tribal children learn in the home.109 Congress determined
that the “collective nature of tribal life itself” required efforts to keep
children within tribal families.110 To achieve this goal, Indian child
welfare proceedings must give preference to placing children with
members of their extended families or families chosen by the tribe.111
Another important statute, NAGPRA, discussed in greater detail in
Section IV, recognizes the collective nature of tribes and the group
interest in seeking return of sacred property.
By contrast, Australian courts have taken a broader view of
collective rights when assessing indigenous intellectual property rights.
In Milpurrurru v. Indofurn Party, Ltd.,112 an Australian company
manufactured carpets in Vietnam that reproduced the designs of several
prominent indigenous artists.113 The artists sold some paintings to the
Australian National Gallery, which produced posters of the paintings;
Indofurn obtained the images from these posters.114 The plaintiffs
brought a copyright infringement action against Indofurn, seeking
compensation, as well as acknowledgement of the communal harm
resulting from unauthorized use of aboriginal designs.”115
Accepting the artists’ arguments, the court awarded plaintiffs
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes”).
107. Riley, supra note 75, at 205. However, there has not been continuous
recognition of sovereignty. Id. at 206 n.143.
108. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–63 (1983) (“Recognizing the special relationship
between the United States and the Indian tribes and their members and the
Federal responsibility to the Indian people, Congress finds . . . .”).
109. Riley, supra note 75, at 211–12 (“In evaluating a proper scheme for the
Indian child welfare system, Congress focused on the ‘values of Indian culture,’
rather than the Anglo-American model, which is heavily centered around
preferencing the rights of the individual over the community.”).
110. Id. at 212 (“Congress recognized that Indian communities place a
profound emphasis on ‘collective rights’ thinking, in which Indians are taught to
conceive of themselves as part of the larger cultural group, in which every child
belongs to its family as well as to the tribe”); see also Jennifer Nutt Carleton, The
ICWA: A Study in the Codification of the Ethnic Best Interests of the Child, 81 MARQ.
L. REV. 21, 38 (1997) (“Many Indians are taught to think of themselves as part of
the larger group, where every child belongs to both its family and to the tribe.”).
111. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a)–(b) (2012).
112. (1994) 54 FCR 240, 240 (Austl.).
113. Id. at 240 (“In 1991, the first respondent commenced importation of
carpets manufactured in Vietnam which reproduced Aboriginal artworks, the
copyright in which was owned by the applicants.”).
114. Id. at 244–50.
115. Gana, supra note 65, at 134.
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damages for copyright infringement and injunctions to prevent the
further use of the images.116 The defendants’ actions threatened to
distort the paintings’ meanings.117 The use of the paintings as images for
carpet was considered particularly offensive to the indigenous people.118
However, despite the court’s deference to the indigenous community,
the decision, which rested on copyright principles, awarded
compensation only to the individual artists.119
More recently, in the case of Bulun Bulun v. R&T Textiles Party,
Ltd.,120 an indiginous artist who owned a valid copyright in his work
sued after discovering that his paintings were being used in textiles
produced by the defendant. The plaintiff argued that the “unauthorised
reproduction of [the image] threaten[s] the whole system and ways that
underpin the stability and continuance of Yolngu society,” by interfering
with relationships between artists and their community and thwarting
generations of custom.121 The court agreed, finding that a fiduciary
relationship exists between artists and their communities: “the interest
of Ganalbingu people in protection of that ritual knowledge from
exploitation which is contrary to their law and custom is deserving of
the protection of the Australian legal system.”122
Thus, Australian courts have recognized the need for indigenous
people to be able to protect their communities’ intellectual property.
Nevertheless, these cases may be less applicable in the context of Native
American communities. Both Milupurrurru and Bulun Bulun involved
identifiable artists whose works were protected under copyright.
Additionally, the works were copied wholesale.
While Chilkat was not an intellectual property dispute, the court’s

116. Milpurrurru, 54 FCR at 272–83.
117. Id. See Gana, supra note 65, at 134 (“Inaccuracy, or error in the faithful
reproduction of painting, can cause deep offence to those familiar with the
dreaming.”).
118. Grad, supra note 100, at 218 (“This practice was particularly offensive to
the aboriginal people because carpet is a medium for walking on, and its use is
inconsistent with traditional aboriginal cultural practices.”).
119. Id. Arguably, though, the broader community benefitted from the
issuance of injunctions.
120. (1998) 157 ALR 193 (Austl.).
121. Id. at 199.
122. Id. at 210–12 (“Central to the fiduciary concept is the protection of
interests that can be regarded as worthy of judicial protection . . . . The evidence
is all one way. The ritual knowledge relating to Djulibinyamurr embodied
within the artistic work is of great importance to members of the Ganalbingu
people. I have no hesitation in holding that the interest of Ganalbingu people in
protection of that ritual knowledge from exploitation which is contrary to their
law and custom is deserving of the protection of the Australian legal system.”)
(citation omitted).
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unwillingness to recognize collective property rights hints at the
difficulty that would face Native American tribes seeking to copyright
collectively produced cultural property absent specific statutory action.
Some commentators have called for a sui generis intellectual property
law that, like ICWA, “would give tribal governments primary
jurisdiction over claims concerning their culturally important work.”123
Such legislation would need to address the different modes of cultural
production, such as serial collaboration, that frustrate efforts to apply
federal intellectual property law to Native American works.124

IV. PROGRAMS AND LEGISLATION CURRENTLY IN PLACE TO
RECOGNIZE NATIVE AMERICAN BELIEFS AND PROTECT
SIGNIFICANT WORKS
Despite the difficulties of obtaining copyright protection, Alaska
Native groups may take advantage of other programs currently in place
to protect their intangible cultural property. Two of these avenues,
authentication programs and NAGPRA, offer rights that reflect concepts
similar to intellectual property protection, and are discussed below.
A.

Authentication Programs

The sale of counterfeit goods is a global problem, and Native
Alaksan arts and crafts are no exception. In 1996, the Federal Trade
Comission took its most aggressive action in this area, after years of
investigation, by filing complaints against two Seattle-based companies,
Ivory Jack’s and Northwest Tribal Arts. These stores logged hundreds of
thousands of dollars in profit by selling carvings created by Ngoc Ly, a
Vietnamese carver, as authentic Alaskan works.125 In addition to
stocking the artwork, the defendants provided false biographical
information for the supposed carvers, and furnished the works with

123. Jill Koren Kelley, Owning the Sun: Can Native Culture Be Protected Through
Current Intellectual Property Law?, 7 J. HIGH TECH. L. 180, 197 (2007) (“Ultimately,
proposals for a sui generis intellectual property law, which take into account
diverse interests of Native American peoples, may be the most effective longterm solution for overcoming the pitfalls of the current regime.”).
124. Id. (“Legislation must also recognize the inherent difference between
current copyright laws and property cumulatively created by more than one
individual in a family line or by a group of individuals in a social institution.”).
125. Ivory Jack’s and Northwest Tribal Arts to Settle FTC Charges that they Sold
Fake Native American Artwork, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (Apr. 12, 1996),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1996/04/ivory-j.shtm (Ly sold his wares
under the Native-sounding alias “Eddie Lyngoc.”).
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hangtags proclaiming the carvings to be Native-made.126 In settlement,
the parties agreed to measures to prevent the further sale of falsely
labeled goods, such as clearly labeling pieces as “Native style” instead of
“Native made,” and ceasing to use Native-sounding names.127
The Ivory Jack’s case illustrates some of the reasons behind
authentication programs. Alaska Natives produce arts and crafts to
supplement income or to support themselves.128 Economics aside, arts
and crafts are also “a cultural gift and a source of self-esteem and
identity within the Native community.”129 Native crafts have been
heavily promoted by government officials “not so much as a way to
improve the economic situation of Native artisans as for the benefit of
the state’s fastest growing industry—tourism.”130 As the trade in Nativeproduced crafts has flourished, sales of knockoffs and other problems of
misrepresentation have also increased.131 In some cases, the quality of
non-Native goods may be very high, with some artists struggling to
match the quality of imitations.132
In an attempt to clearly distinguish authentic Native crafts, Alaska

126. Id. (“In addition to providing the artwork, the complaint alleges, the
defendants provided shopowners with biographies describing Ron Komok’s
Native-American heritage and training in carving, and hangtags stating that the
carvings sold by Ivory Jack’s are Native-made.”).
127. Id. (“The proposed consent decrees settling these charges, subject to
court approval, would prohibit the defendants, in connection with the sale of
Native-American style art objects, from representing that any such object is
Native-made or that any such object is made in Alaska or made from materials
of Alaskan origin, unless such is true and from misrepresenting the source of
such objects, their country of origin, or the materials from which they are
made.”).
128. Julie Hollowell, Intellectual Property Protection and the Market for Alaska
Native Arts and Crafts, in INDIGENOUS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 55, 57 (Mary
Riley ed., 2004) (“Over half of all Alaska Natives live in mixed cash and
subsistence economies, and, for many of them, locally produced arts and crafts
act as vital supplements to income and one of the only sources of cash not
dependent on government programs.”).
129. Id. (“But arts and crafts are more than just a safety net; they are, as one
carver described, a cultural gift and a source of self-esteem and identity within
the Native community.”) (citation omitted).
130. Id. The state’s apparent objectives were consumer protection and also a
desire to “minimize the economic impact of products made elsewhere [i.e., out
of state] that were flooding the tourist market.” Id. at 87 n.14.
131. Id. at 60. Studies estimate that as much as 50% of “all Native or Indian
arts and crafts sold in the United States may not have been made by American
Indian people.” Id. Consumers have a clear preference for Native-made goods;
FTC research indicates that consumers will pay 30-40% more for Native crafts.
Id.
132. Id. at 62 (“Second, they don’t produce enough work on a consistent basis
or of consistent quality to supply the growing tourist demand.”).
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developed the “Silver Hand” program.133 Administered by the Alaska
State Council on the Arts,134 the state-sponsored program is available to
Natives free of charge.135 The Silver Hand seal indicates to consumers
“that the artwork on which it appears is created by hand in Alaska by an
individual Alaska Native artist.”136 The Silver Hand is essentially a
trademark, specifically a collective mark, which serves to identify the
origin of goods. It provides no information, however, about the quality
of the artwork or the authenticity of the craft’s design or form.137
The Silver Hand program’s efficacy has been questioned.138 Some
retailers have been hesitant to carry goods with the Silver Hand, in some
cases even illegally139 removing stickers “so that non-Native items in
their stores would not suffer from this ‘implication of inauthenticity.’”140
At the same time, enforcement is questionable, and there have even been
reports of goods marked with tags designed to imitate the Silver Hand,
thereby directly competing with and diminishing the Silver Hand’s
ability to “distinguish Native-made goods.”141
Despite these concerns, the program has been revised and
expanded, and is considered the most successful state-implemented
authentication program, with high rates of adoption among Native
133. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.65.010–45.65.070 (“The identification seal may be
affixed only to original articles of authentic Alaska Native art created and
crafted in the state.”).
134. See Silver Hand Program, ALASKA STATE COUNCIL ON THE ARTS,
http://www.eed.state.ak.us/aksca/native.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2012) (“The
Silver Hand image . . . may only be used by individuals or organizations with
the Alaska State Council on the Arts’ explicit permission.”).
135. Hollowell, supra note 128, at 65. A certain number of tags are provided
to artists for free; if more are needed, they are available at a nominal rate. See
Alaska Native Arts Program, ALASKA STATE COUNCIL ON THE ARTS,
http://www.eed.state.ak.us/aksca/native.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2012).
136. Id. (“The seal indicates that the artwork on which it appears is created by
hand in Alaska by an individual Alaska Native artist.”).
137. Hollowell, supra note 128, at 65 (“The Silver Hand emblem has nothing
to do with quality or with the authenticity of Native designs or art forms.”).
138. See id. (“Many people consider the Silver Hand virtually meaningless
without adequate enforcement and public education for tourists and shop
owners.”).
139. See ALASKA STAT. § 45.65.060 (stating that misuse or abuse of the Silver
Hand constitutes a Class B felony).
140. Hollowell, supra note 128, at 66. This same concern has been echoed by
artists, who worried that “tourists might assume anything sold without a Silver
Hand is not Native made,” which would “be unfair to artists who [had not]
registered for the program.” Id. at 67.
141. Id. See also Molly Torsen, Intellectual Property and Traditional Cultural
Expressions: A Synopsis of Current Issues, 3 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 199,
212 (2008) (“These mechanisms are not fool-proof; however, the Alaska State
employee who heads the Silver Hand program indicated that the Silver Hand
tags have been reported counterfeited and sold to non-Natives for profit.”).
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artisans.142 Official discourse has shifted from protecting consumers to
protecting Alaska Native artists.143 Most recently, blood quantum
requirements were removed; now only citizenship in Alaska and
membership in an Alaska Native tribe are required.144 The bill also
replaced provisions that required the use of natural, traditional
materials, with a broadened definition of “work of art” that essentially
encompasses traditional and contemporary Alaska Native works.145 Of
course, such an authentication program is effective only if consumers
understand the meaning and importance of the Silver Hand program, so
consumer education efforts, coupled with increased adoption of the
symbol by artisans, are necessary for its functioning.
The Silver Hand program, as noted above, essentially creates a
trademark to identify Alaska Native-produced goods. In this sense, the
intellectual property system promotes improvement for Alaska Native
artisans’ economic situations. Importantly, however, the Silver Hand
mark protects only the designation of origin. It does not prohibit or in
any way impact the use of Native symbols, imagery, and art forms by
non-Native craftsmen. The Silver Hand program thus does not prohibit
the use of this cultural property by non-Natives, which may be an
unsatisfactory solution for Alaska Native groups concerned about the
use of their intellectual property.
B.

NAGPRA and the Recognition of Collective Rights

The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act
(“NAGPRA)”146 explicitly recognized tribal interests by facilitating the
return to tribal possession of human remains, sacred objects, and
cultural patrimony.147 Congress enacted NAGPRA in response to issues

142. Hollowell, supra note 128, at 75 (“In spite of all its problems, the Silver
Hand is considered one of the best Native arts authentication programs in the
United States. The geometric growth in artisans who have registered to use the
emblem over the past five years attests that Native artists value its use, whether
for material or symbolic reasons.”).
143. See id. (“In general, the wider the use of the Silver Hand by artisans and
retailers, the more protection it provides to both consumers and Native artists.”).
144. S.B. 97, 25th Legislature, 25th Sess. (Alaska 2008) (considering
identification seals on items created by Alaska Natives). The legislation
previously required the artist to be at least one-quarter “Indian, Aleut, or
Eskimo.” Id. Eliminating this requirement will allow Alaska Native tribes to use
their own requirements for membership as the basis of Silver Hand eligibility.
145. See ALASKA STAT. § 45.65.070(9) (2012) (“‘work of art’ means a creation or
crafting of . . . traditional Alaska Native materials, including ivory, bone, grass,
baleen, animal skins, wood, furs . . . .”).
146. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–3013 (2012).
147. § 3001. This goal is evidenced, for instance, in the definition of cultural
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that surfaced in Chilkat, providing tribes with a mechanism to facilitate
the return of objects taken from the tribe without permission.148
NAGPRA focuses solely on sacred communal property.149 Transactions
involving these protected objects are presumptively invalid, because the
objects are presumed to be inalienable and owned by tribes as
communal property.150 NAGPRA’s proceedings also focus on tribal
action: NAGPRA requires museums and other institutions to inventory
their Native American holdings, and make this inventory available to
tribes.151 Tribes may make requests for the repatriation of cultural
property, after which the museums must transfer the materials back to
the tribe. Individual members may not invoke NAGPRA and may not be
the recipients of tribal property.152
Because NAGPRA provides a comprehensive framework for the
repatriation of Native American artifacts, some scholars have hailed the
statute as a “core piece of human rights legislation.”153 Other scholars,
however, were originally concerned about how NAGPRA would impact
museums and the public domain.154 Instead, NAGPRA did not have the
effect that its strong language would indicate; despite provisions
mandating compliance, the University of California, Berkeley’s Phoebe

patrimony: “‘cultural patrimony’ [] shall mean an object having ongoing
historical, traditional, or cultural importance central to the Native American
group or culture itself, rather than property owned by an individual Native
American.” § 3001(3)(D) (emphasis added).
148. H.R. REP. NO. 877, at 8 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4367, 4368,
1990 WL 200613 (“The Act also sets up a process by which Federal agencies and
museums receiving federal funds will inventory holdings of such remains and
objects and work with appropriate Indian tribes and Native Hawaiian
organizations to reach agreement on repatriation or other disposition of these
remains and objects.”).
149. Id. (“The purpose of [NAGPRA] is to protect Native American burial
sites and the removal of human remains, funerary objects, sacred objects, and
objects of cultural patrimony on Federal, Indian and Native Hawaiian lands.”).
150. 25 U.S.C. § 3002. See also Riley, supra note 75 at 213–14 (“These objects
fall within the category of ‘cultural patrimony,’ and are presumed to be
communally owned and inalienable by individual tribal members.”). An
exception is made, however, in the case of transactions by a governing body. §
3002(e).
151. §§ 3003, 3004 (“Each Federal agency and each museum . . . shall compile
an inventory . . . [and] shall provide a written summary of such objects . . . .”).
152. Riley, supra note 75, at 217 (“Ownership of tribal intangible property
would remain solely in the tribe forever, inalienable by individual tribal
members.”).
153. Kristin Carpenter, Sonia Katyal & Angela Riley, In Defense of Property,
118 YALE L.J. 1022, 1089 (2009) (citing Jack F. Trope & Walter R. Echo-Hawk, The
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act: Background and Legislative
History, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35, 39 (1992)).
154. See id. at 1094–97 (discussing and responding to critics of NAGPRA).
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A. Hearst Museum of Anthropology continues to resist repatriating the
remains of thousands of Native Americans.155 NAGPRA also does not
apply to non-federal institutions such as art dealers and private
collectors.156
NAGPRA has the potential, through its provisions about cultural
patrimony, to help tribes in intellectual property disputes. Through
NAGPRA, tribes may seek the return of sacred objects and their removal
from public display. Limiting the public display of objects allows tribes
to obtain an analogue of trade secret protection.157 Preventing the
dissemination of cultural patrimony allows the tribes to obtain
essentially perpetual protection. However, once objects enter the public
domain, they cannot leave, absent specific legislation to the contrary.158
Thus, in the case of objects of cultural patrimony, such as crest symbols
that have already entered the public domain through distribution and
replication, tribes have no remedy under NAGPRA or trade secret law
against imitators.
Both the Silver Hand program and NAGPRA provide intellectual
property-like tools to tribes. Serving a trademark purpose, the Silver
Hand program seeks to prevent the passing off of non-Native-made
goods as Native arts and crafts. NAGPRA allows tribes a greater degree
of control over their artifacts and cultural patrimony, which would
otherwise be free for the taking. Unfortunately, both NAGPRA and the
Silver Hand program provide Alaska Natives with only limited
remedies.

V. SELECTED CASE STUDIES
This Section provides a variety of scenarios that illustrate different

155. Id. at 1097 (“[R]emains of some twelve thousand American Indians [are]
currently stored in archives beneath the Hearst Gymnasium swimming pool.”).
156. Kelley, supra note 123, at 197 (“For example, NAGPRA has been
described as ‘under-inclusive in its application . . . [because] [n]on-federal
institutions such as art auction houses, dealers and private collectors are not
bound by the Act.’”).
157. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995) (“A
trade secret is any information that can be used in the operation of a business or
other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or
potential economic advantage over others.”). Trade secret protection is under
state law. See ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.471(b) (2012) (defining trade secret law in
Alaska).
158. See Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that
restoring copyright to foreign works which had entered the public domain for
failure to comply with American copyright’s pre-1976 formalities was
permissible because there was a “rational basis” for the legislation, chiefly to
bring the United States into compliance with the Berne Convention).
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solutions to the inevitably enduring discussion of Alaska Native cultural
property. Notably, none of these cases were decided using intellectual
property law.
A.

“Tlingit Barbie” Revisited

Although “Tlingit Barbie”159 may have raised eyebrows among
consumers, her introduction did not raise tensions with the Tlingit tribe.
On the contrary, Mattel developed this doll, aimed at the collectors’
market, in collaboration with the Sealaska Heritage Institute and with
the support of tribal leaders. The doll reflects some concessions to
Mattel’s marketing concerns, such as the choice of colors, but otherwise
imitates the look and feel of Tlingit design.160 “Tlingit Barbie” provides
an example of constructive cultural collaboration between Alaska
Natives and non-Natives. Working in an advisory role, the Sealaska
Heritage Institute provided input on the doll’s presentation.
Such partnerships could represent an option for Alaska Natives
frustrated with the production and marketing of non-Native souvenirs;
by working with outside manufacturers, tribes could license particular
styles and images, and also provide guidance (or refuse to provide
information) on what sacred images they do not want to see adorning
souvenirs. While the goods would no longer be produced by Alaska
Natives, and thus would not qualify for the Silver Hand program, a
licensing arrangement could still prove beneficial. A particular
trademark, similar to the Silver Hand, could be developed to identify
these “Native-advised” goods, with percentages of the proceeds of their
sale going to the tribes. However, creating another trademark may lead
to consumer confusion, as is already true of the Silver Hand and its
widespread imitation. Additionally, this solution does not address the
displacement of Alaska Native carvings and other crafts resulting from
the availability of cheaper knockoffs.
B.

The Sitka Totem Poles

True to its name, Sitka’s Totem Square showcases a large totem
pole. The pole commemorates an 1805 peace treaty between Russian
settlers and the Tlingits, and its carvings include symbols of all parties

159. For a description of “Tlingit Barbie,” see supra note 1 and accompanying
text.
160. Ruskin, supra note 1, at 12B. (“Of course, the earth tones on her outfit
didn’t look right, said the dancers, who were wearing traditional red and black
dance garb. And the designs didn’t look very Tlingit to them.”).
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involved. The U.S. Forest Service commissioned the totem pole during
the 1940s at the suggestion of Sitka’s Kiks.ádi clan, a Tlingit people, with
the intent of mitigating local unemployment.161 Controversially, the
work was assigned not to the Kiks.ádi, but rather to workers with the
Civilian Conservation Corps.162 Further angering locals, the top figure
on the totem pole, a representation of Aleksandr Baranov, thengovernor of Russian America, appears to be naked.163 This unflattering
depiction has the effect of making the pole seem, to some viewers, like a
shame pole, a special category of totem pole carved to ridicule their
subject.164 Even as soon as the totem pole was unveiled, Native leaders
expressed concern that this depiction would have the effect of
“dishonoring the great man who was in charge at the time of war and
[peace].”165
The Sitka Totem pole has proven controversial because, aside from
the original suggestion, tribal leaders had little input in its
construction.166 In some Natives’ view, the government paid nonNatives to carve in a style imbued with deep meaning, the results
conveyed a message contrary to local sentiment, and the totem pole was
placed on prominent display.
By contrast, the federal government avoided many of these
mistakes with a recently constructed totem pole, commissioned by the
Census Bureau to boost awareness and encourage participation in the
2010 Census.167 Featuring symbols of the two Tlingit moieties, the Eagle

161. Anne Sutton, Top Man on Totem Pole Could Get His Clothes Back,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, June 8, 2008, http://www.adn.com/2008/06/08/vprinter/430035/top-man-on-totem-pole-could-get.html (“The pole was a project
of the Civilian Conservation Corps, a work program that was part of Franklin D.
Roosevelt’s ‘New Deal.’ It was launched during the Depression to put people to
work.”).
162. See id. (“In Southeast Alaska, Civilian Conservation Corps jobs included
the carving and repair of totem poles.”).
163. Id. (“Hope wrote that the pole did not represent the true story of the
peace treaty, noting that Baranov was placed at the top of the pole ‘naket,
dishonoring the great man who was in charge at the time of war and pease
[sic].’”).
164. Id. (“‘The local Tlingit community didn’t want that to happen to
Baranov,’ he said. ‘They wanted to make peace, but the Wrangell carver carved
him naked and that was kind of a shameful thing to do.’”).
165. Id.
166. See Ed Ronco, Controversial Totem Pole Returns to Sitka Square, KCAW
(Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.kcaw.org/2011/11/28/controversial-totem-polereturns-to-sitka-square/ (“Designed by George Benson in the early 1940s, the
pole was actually carved in Wrangell by workers with the Civilian Conservation
Corps. That caused some hard feelings among the locals.”).
167. Shannon Haugland, Sitka Totem Pole Adds Stature to U.S. Census, SITKA
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and the Raven,168 the totem pole was constructed by a local Native
carver, Tommy Joseph.169 By consulting with tribes and employing an
Alaska Native to direct the project, the Census Bureau avoided
offending the Alaska Natives, while also using awareness of totem
poles’ significance to heighten visibility of the Census.
C.

Contemporary Alaska Native Artists, Appropriation Art, and
Remix Culture

Several contemporary Alaska Native artists, including Donny
Varnell, Nicholas Galanin, Da-ka-xeen Mehner, and Stephen Jackson,
are actively developing styles that blend traditional motifs and imagery
with modern influences.170 In 2005, Donny Varnell, a carver who is part
Haida, created some controversy when he unveiled plans for a
commissioned totem pole that featured Japanese manga-style figures.171
After some discussion with community members, Varnell modified his
design slightly, but still maintained the basic stylistic ideas, hoping to
both appeal to and inspire young students.172
Appropriation art is nothing new, and has generally prevailed in
court challenges.173 Thus far, none of these artists have faced legal
challenges, but their provocative work has sparked some dialogue about
the changing roles of artists in Alaska Native communities. Whether
tribes will object to, and mount legal challenges to block, the use of their
traditional imagery in non-traditional media remains to be seen. Tribes
may even benefit from the enhanced exposure which could result.

SENTINEL, Feb. 21, 2010, available at http://www.adn.com/2010/03/06/vprinter/1171521/sitka-carvers-totem-pole-adds.html.
168. Id.
169. Id. (“Sitka carver Tommy Joseph completed the pole in 15 days, and it
had its first public viewing atop a truck in Tuesday’s Elizabeth Peratrovich day
parade down Lincoln Street.”); see also Tommy Joseph, ALASKA NATIVE ARTISTS,
http://www.alaskanativeartists.com/tommy_joseph.htm (last accessed Oct. 5,
2012) (including under recent pole commissions, “20-foot pole for Shee Atika
Inc., Sitka”).
170. Aldona Jonaitis, A Generation of Innovators in Southeast Alaska, 33 AM.
IND. ART MAGAZINE 56–67 (2008).
171. Peter Porco, Southeast Carver Combines Influences to Inspire Elementary
Students, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Oct. 31, 2005, available at http://
juneauempire.com /stories/103105/sta_20051031010.shtml.
172. Id.
173. See, e.g., Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 259 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding
artist’s use of a photograph was fair use). But see Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301,
313–14 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that copying imagery and entering into direct
competition with the original is not a fair use but rather infringement).

SCHUSSEL_V8.0 (DO NOT DELETE)

2012
D.

COPYRIGHT AND CULTURAL PROPERTY

12/9/2012 5:59 PM

339

The Return of Alutiiq Songs

Among colonization’s many negative impacts, cultural suppression
has proven to be one of the most enduring and damaging. For instance,
by creating a Roman-based alphabet for the Vietnamese language, the
French suppressed the traditional Vietnamese script, effectively cutting
off the Vietnamese people from a great body of historical culture.174 The
colonial legacy in Alaska has had similar effects on Alaska Native tribes.
During the Russian period, a number of Alutiiq songs and dances were
lost outright.175 Through the loss of their cultural patrimony, the Alutiq
lost this connection to their heritage.
Well over a hundred years later, however, the Tlingit continued to
sing these songs. A member of the Kiks.ádi clan of the Tlingit married
an Alutiiq woman in Kodiak and learned the songs while living in the
Alutiiq community.176 After his wife’s death, the man returned to his
clan in Sitka, where he taught the songs to his community.177
Amazingly, despite minor changes and all the years, the songs remained
understandable to the Alutiiq.178 In a June 2010 festival, members of the
two tribes gathered in Sitka, where the Kiks.ádi taught the five songs to
the Alutiiq, formally presenting the Alutiiq with a piece of their cultural
heritage.179
This event illustrates the potential for tribal collaboration in
protecting cultural history. Rather than pursuing any kind of legal
claims against the Tlingit for copying their songs, the Alutiiq were able
to strengthen a bond with the Tlingit. Recounting the episode, Steve
Henrikson, curator at the Alaska State Museum commented,
“sometimes the only reason things survive is because they are stolen.”180

174. PAMELA A. PEARS, REMNANTS OF EMPIRE IN ALGERIA AND VIETNAM:
WOMEN, WORDS, AND WAR 18 (2004) (“However, Gail Kelly points out that the
reformed script of the Vietnamese alphabet, Quoc-Ngu, instituted by the French,
effectively separated ensuing generations of Vietnamese students from their
own national literature, because they could no longer read it.”).
175. Dusty Kidd, Alutiiq & Tlingit Cultural Sharing 2010, U.S. NAT’L PARK
SERV.
(June
25,
2010),
http://www.nps.gov/sitk/2010-june-culturalsharing.htm.
176. Alutiiq Songs Return, ALUTIIQ MUS., http://alutiiqmuseum.org/exhibits
/electronic-exhibits/5 (last accessed Oct. 7, 2012).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Telephone interview with Steve Henrikson, Curator, Alaska State
Museum (Nov. 23, 2011).
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CONCLUSION
Because Alaska Native works will typically fail to satisfy copyright
protection’s threshold requirements, they will generally be unprotected
by intellectual property laws. This leads to several possible conclusions.
Some parties seek to confer copyright protection onto indigenous
cultural property by lessening the restrictive requirements of copyright
law. Accordingly, some scholars have called for the establishment of
self-contained sui generis statutory schemes to provide an exception to
an otherwise default rule. While adapting intellectual property laws to
better accommodate indigenous interests could yield results going
forward, this may prove difficult to implement. Furthermore, the
constitutionality of removing material from the public domain has been
challenged,181 so retroactive application of any broadened intellectual
property laws would likely draw constitutional scrutiny.
An alternative approach, which this Note cautiously advocates, is
to preserve what is essentially the status quo. Some evidence suggests
that greater copyright protection does not necessarily incentivize
production.182 Alaska Natives can seek to avail themselves of other
remedies, like NAGPRA, and programs such as the Silver Hand, to
monitor and protect the use of sacred imagery and traditional styles. The
presented case studies highlight the lack of litigation resulting from the
use of Alaska Native artwork. Instead, and particularly important in an
age of remix culture, Tlingit Barbie and the contemporary artists
illustrate the benefits of collaboration and discussion.
In order to effectuate a rebirth of Native arts and culture, it may be
better to allow access to the bulk of cultural property, reserving only the
sacred elements through trade secret-like protection.

181. See Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076, 1082 (10th Cir. 2010) (challenging a
provision that restored copyright protection to foreign works that had fallen into
the public domain), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
182. See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities, First Evaluation of
Directive 96/9/EC on the Legal Protection of Databases 24, (Dec. 12, 2005)
(unpublished
working
paper)
(available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/databases/evaluation_re
port_en.pdf) (“The second problem with the ‘sui generis’ right is that its
economic impact on database production is unproven. Introduced to stimulate
the growth of databases in Europe, the new instrument has had no proven
impact on the production of databases.”).

